KabulMetro

**No Kabul metro- or Kabul province-specific youth unemployment (15-24 male) statistics were identified for 2026 or recent periods.** National-level data and anecdotal/local reporting predominate, with urban centers like Kabul noted as particularly strained by returnee inflows and weak job creation. The baseline national youth unemployment (15-24 male) of 15.8% (2025) and instability fuse score of 43.0/100 remain the reference points; recent developments largely reinforce or intensify pressures without providing granular updates that would allow precise local recalibration.[[1]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSAFG)[[2]](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-08-18/womens-share-of-afghan-labour-market-shrinks-to-5-under-taliban-un-says)

**1. Local labor market reports or unemployment data specific to Kabul metro (last ~60 days, i.e., since late June 2026):**  
No dedicated provincial or metro-level youth or overall unemployment figures emerged. Reporting highlights persistent weakness in Kabul’s casual/daily-wage labor market, with returnee-driven labor supply increases cited as a key stressor in urban areas.  

- A July 9, 2026, Hasht-e Subh report on Kabul documented rising child labor (street vending, waste collection, shoe shining, etc.) explicitly linked to adult unemployment, economic crisis, and declining humanitarian aid. Residents described the trend as “alarming” in recent months, with visible increases in working children (including girls) across city markets and streets; one resident noted a significant rise compared to the prior government era and warned of future social harms like crime.[[3]](https://8am.media/eng/kabul-child-labor-poverty-rise/)[[3]](https://8am.media/eng/kabul-child-labor-poverty-rise/)  
- Broader context from the ILO’s August 18, 2026 brief (national but with direct urban implications): Overall Afghan employment reached ~8.5 million in 2026 (up 14% from 2022 low), but growth has not kept pace with population/returnee-driven expansion. The employment-to-population ratio stood at an estimated 32.5% (down >4 pp from 2020). Gains were “concentrated entirely among men,” with male employment ~22% above 2020 levels, while female participation collapsed to 5.1%. Large-scale returns from Pakistan/Iran have added pressure to already fragile markets, with many returnees entering communities facing poverty and limited livelihoods—particularly relevant for Kabul as a major destination.[[2]](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-08-18/womens-share-of-afghan-labour-market-shrinks-to-5-under-taliban-un-says)[[4]](https://www.ilo.org/publications/afghanistans-labour-market-five-years-after-taliban-takeover-trends)[[5]](https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/women-increasingly-excluded-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-labour-market-wider-employment)  
- World Bank references (e.g., May/June 2026 updates) note high unemployment, low incomes, and returnee inflows straining labor markets and services in urban areas.[[6]](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/fc5f2174f83b5e1f650db6068db3347f-0310012026/original/Afghanistan-Development-Update-May-2026.pdf)

**2. Political, security, or economic events in Kabul affecting young men (18-35) — protests, militia activity, economic shocks, crackdowns, mass layoffs (last 60 days):**  
- **Protests/discontent:** Rare public protests occurred in mid-June 2026 (primarily Herat but with ripple effects/preparations in Kabul), featuring chants for “work, education, freedom.” Men participated alongside women; Taliban responses included checkpoints in Kabul, religious leader instructions to discourage gatherings, and clinic warnings against treating injured protesters. Two deaths and injuries reported in related Herat events.[[7]](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/12/world/asia/taliban-protests-afghanistan.html)  
- **Taliban 5-year anniversary (August 15, 2026):** Celebrations/parades in Kabul (armored vehicles, flags) coincided with aid/rights group warnings of record humanitarian needs, droughts, earthquakes, deportations/returns, and economic strain. Unemployment and poverty repeatedly highlighted as drivers of vulnerability among young Afghans.[[8]](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-08-15/taliban-mark-five-years-in-power-as-aid-groups-warn-of-crisis)[[9]](https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/asia-pacific/afghanistan/five-years-after-fall-kabul-talibans-biggest-test-yet)  
- **Returnee pressures (ongoing, intensified context):** Millions of returns (Taliban claimed ~8 million total by August 2026; >6 million since late 2023 per IOM/UN sources) have heightened competition for jobs in Kabul and other urban centers. IOM data cited in ILO reporting: 54% of male returnees and 91% of female returnees had not worked in the prior 30 days; most households earned <10,000 AFN/month and were in debt. UNHCR noted only ~3% formal employment among returnees in high-inflow provinces, with 78% in casual labor. Kabul and other cities face acute shelter/livelihood strains.[[5]](https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/women-increasingly-excluded-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-labour-market-wider-employment)[[10]](https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-08/ILO%20Brief%20Afghanistan%20Taliban%20Takeover_.pdf)[[11]](https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/undp-and-unhcr-chiefs-urge-sustained-investment-afghanistan-faces-unprecedented)[[12]](https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-returnee-resilience-overview-round-2-june-2026)  
- No reports of mass layoffs, militia activity, or major crackdowns specifically targeting young men in Kabul metro during the period. Economic shocks tied to returns, weak labor demand, and external factors (e.g., Middle East crisis impacts on energy/inflation) are noted nationally.[[5]](https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/women-increasingly-excluded-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-labour-market-wider-employment)  
- RFE/RL reporting (August 14, 2026) on young professionals in Kabul described modest ambitions (“just want a stable job”), poverty, and closed opportunities post-2021, with examples of low earnings (e.g., 7,000 AFN/~$105 monthly after commute).[[13]](https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-kabul-young-professionals-taliban/33827745.html)

**3. NGO or think-tank reports on Kabul’s youth situation published in 2025:**  
Limited new 2025/2026 Kabul-specific youth reports identified in results. The most relevant recent output is the ILO brief (August 18, 2026), which emphasizes youth alongside returnees and women as priority groups needing expanded productive employment opportunities. Earlier Hasht-e Subh reporting (May 2026) on Kabul youth highlighted unemployment, nepotism in government hiring, and vanished private-sector roles, with educated young men struggling.[[4]](https://www.ilo.org/publications/afghanistans-labour-market-five-years-after-taliban-takeover-trends)[[14]](https://8am.media/eng/kabul-youth-unemployment-job-opportunities/) Broader UN/World Bank notes on returnee reintegration challenges apply to Kabul but are not youth-exclusive.

**4. Changes to internet/mobile infrastructure in Kabul (shutdowns, rollouts, outages, last 60 days):**  
- Mobile network cutoff in Kabul (and other provinces) on June 26, 2026 (Ashura observance), with antennas deactivated from ~7:00 a.m. local time. Taliban provided no explanation but have cited “security” in prior similar religious-period shutdowns. This fits a recurring pattern.[[15]](https://x.com/Etilaatroz/status/2070464795891929368)  
- No other major outages, nationwide blackouts, or significant 5G/fiber rollouts reported in Kabul during the period (trial 5G launch was earlier, April 2026; earlier 2025 shutdowns noted but outside window). Rumors of fiber/Wi-Fi shutdowns were denied in May 2026.[[16]](https://pajhwok.com/2026/04/30/trial-5g-services-launched-in-kabul/)

**Assessment vs. baseline:** Developments reinforce rather than sharply shift the instability picture. Persistent weak labor demand in Kabul, combined with large-scale returnee inflows adding to youth/young adult competition in urban informal/casual sectors, child labor as a visible coping mechanism, and episodic expressions of discontent (protests) point to sustained or heightened pressures on young men (18-35). No Kabul-specific metrics contradict the national baseline, but urban concentration of returns and anecdotal desperation suggest localized exacerbation. Sources consistently flag the need for livelihood support targeting youth and returnees to mitigate risks.

**NSIA (National Statistics and Information Authority) publications (e.g., Quarterly Statistical Indicators and population estimates)**: nsia.gov.af (PDFs and tables available via site or mirrored on HDX). No public API; machine-readable downloads (PDF/XLSX/CSV via HDX). Updates quarterly or as needed (e.g., population estimates, indicators on employment, services, demographics). Auth: none. Granularity: Provincial (Kabul province) with some urban/Kabul city disaggregation (e.g., population by urban/rural, services in Kabul city).[[1]](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ps-afg)[[2]](https://nsia.gov.af:8443/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%8A-%DA%A9%D9%84%D9%86%DB%8D-%DB%B1%DB%B4%DB%B0%DB%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%85%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%87-2.pdf)[[3]](https://nsia.gov.af:8443/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%B5-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9-%DA%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85-1403.pdf)

**HDX Afghanistan Subnational Population Statistics (sourced from NSIA)**: data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ps-afg. No API; direct CSV/XLSX downloads (adm1/adm2 levels, gazetteer). Updates as needed (recent 2026 estimates). Auth: none. Granularity: Admin level 1 (Kabul province) and level 2 (districts).[[1]](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ps-afg)

**HDX Afghanistan Subnational Administrative Boundaries (COD-AB, from AGCHO/NSIA)**: data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ab-afg. No API; downloads (GeoJSON, SHP, XLSX, GDB). Updates yearly. Auth: none. Granularity: Admin 1 (34 provinces incl. Kabul) and Admin 2 (401 districts). Useful for filtering/mapping Kabul events.[[4]](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ab-afg)

**ACLED Afghanistan dataset (sub-national Kabul coding)**: acleddata.com. API available (standard access; they already pull country-level). Updates near real-time/weekly. Auth: account (free tier or paid for bulk). Granularity: Event-level; improved coding for Kabul city via 22 Police Districts (Kabul-PD1 to PD22) for sub-city filtering (corrections applied 2020–2026).[[5]](https://acleddata.com/update-log/data-update-improved-location-coding-kabul-city-acleds-afghanistan-dataset)

**Pajhwok Afghan News RSS feed**: pajhwok.com/feed. RSS (no dedicated API). Frequent/daily updates. Auth: none. Granularity: National with strong Kabul coverage (Dari, Pashto, English).[[6]](https://rss.feedspot.com/afghanistan_news_rss_feeds/)

**Ariana News RSS feed**: ariananews.af/feed. RSS (no dedicated API). Frequent updates. Auth: none. Granularity: National/Kabul-focused (independent news).[[6]](https://rss.feedspot.com/afghanistan_news_rss_feeds/)

**BBC Pashto RSS feed** (via world-service-rss or bbc.com/pashto): Relevant Pashto-language feed for Afghanistan/Kabul. RSS. Frequent updates. Auth: none. Granularity: Regional/Afghanistan with Kabul stories.[[7]](https://www.bbc.com/pashto)

**World Bank Afghanistan Spatial Database**: worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/publication/afghanistan-spatial-database. Visualizations and underlying data (province/district indicators from ALCS and other sources; downloads/visual tools). No public API noted. One-time circa 2016 (with time-series to 2016). Auth: none. Granularity: Province and district level (incl. Kabul).[[8]](https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/publication/afghanistan-spatial-database)

**Afghanistan Ministry of Education provincial/district data sets**: moe.gov.af/en/data-sets. Downloads (e.g., student enrollment, schools, teachers by district). No API. Periodic (e.g., 1398–1402 solar years). Auth: none. Granularity: District/provincial (Kabul districts).[[9]](https://moe.gov.af/en/data-sets)

**Notes**: No dedicated public API or machine-readable portal was identified for Kabul Municipality (km.gov.af) or a dedicated Kabul provincial stats bureau beyond NSIA outputs. Labor/unemployment data appears limited to NSIA quarterly indicators at provincial level (no finer city-specific API found). Think tank/NGO Kabul-specific trackers (e.g., urban poverty or youth crisis monitoring) were not prominently identified in public machine-readable forms beyond broader HDX or OPHI MPI sub-national layers. Local-language RSS feeds provide ongoing coverage but require parsing. All listed sources are accessible without inference or paid custom access beyond standard APIs.