Haiti

**No new official government, ILO, or World Bank data releases on Haiti youth (15-24) or male unemployment were identified in the last ~60 days (roughly early April–early June 2026).** The most recent modeled ILO/World Bank estimates remain those for 2025, with total youth unemployment (15-24) at approximately 37.5% (FRED/World Bank data, updated Feb 2026).[[1]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSHTI)[[2]](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS) The provided baseline of 30.0% for males (15-24, national, 2025) shows no updates or revisions. Global ILO reports (e.g., World Employment and Social Outlook Trends 2025/2026 releases from Jan 2026) highlight elevated youth challenges in low-income countries, including high NEET rates (~27.9% in low-income settings), but contain no Haiti-specific new figures.[[3]](https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/WESO25_Trends_Report_EN.pdf)[[4]](https://www.facebook.com/ILO.ORG/posts/for-millions-of-young-people-the-path-into-work-is-still-blocked-youth-unemploym/1292161089610538/)

**Significant political, security, and economic developments affecting young men (18-35) continue at a high level, with heavy youth involvement in gangs/militias and no major de-escalation.** 

- Voter/candidate registration for the long-delayed 2026 elections (first in over a decade) was postponed on or around April 9, 2026 (originally set to begin April 1 for voters). No new dates announced; linked to alignment with a national political pact and security/funding issues. First-round elections had been eyed for August 2026.[[5]](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-postpones-voter-registration-first-election-decade-no-new-dates-given-2026-04-09/)[[6]](https://haitiantimes.com/2026/04/09/haiti-delays-voter-and-candidate-registration-amplifying-doubts-about-long-stalled-electoral-process/)
- Deployment of the UN-authorized Gang Suppression Force (GSF, successor to the Kenyan-led MSS mission) progressed: Initial Chadian contingents arrived April 1, 2026 (~400 by late April, with pledges for 1,500 total); GSF commander Maj. Gen. Erdenebat Batsuuri arrived in Port-au-Prince on May 14, 2026. Full force targeted at up to 5,550 personnel; operations slated to ramp up around June 1, 2026. Earlier elements (including some Kenyan drawdown) reported some territorial gains in the capital, but violence persists.[[7]](https://haitiantimes.com/2026/05/15/haiti-gang-suppression-force-mission/)[[8]](https://passblue.com/2026/05/21/the-new-un-backed-anti-gang-force-is-finally-arriving-in-haiti-as-violence-surges/)[[9]](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/1/first-troops-from-un-backed-gang-suppression-force-arrive-in-haiti)
- Gang violence and recruitment remain acute: Gangs (e.g., Viv Ansanm coalition) control ~85-90% of greater Port-au-Prince and have expanded into departments like Artibonite and Centre. Reports detail coordinated attacks (e.g., late March 2026 in Artibonite killing dozens), high casualties (>1,600 killed in Q1 2026 per one UN-linked update, with gangs responsible for ~27% and many more during security operations/drone strikes), sexual violence, kidnappings, and extortion. Young men (and boys) face strong economic incentives to join amid poverty, displacement (1.4M+ IDPs, over half children), and limited alternatives. UN/OHCHR noted an “alarming increase” in child recruitment (UNICEF reported ~200% rise in 2025; estimates that children comprise ~30-50% of gang members overall).[[10]](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166954)[[11]](https://www.rescue.org/article/haitis-gang-violence-crisis-what-know-and-how-help)[[12]](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-04/haiti-34.php)[[13]](https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/06/americas/haiti-gang-children-face-new-foreign-force-latam-intl)[[14]](https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-more-1600-people-killed-first-quarter-2026-human-rights-situation-remains-extremely-worrying)
- Broader context: Ongoing economic contraction (seventh consecutive year projected in some 2025 analyses), high inflation/poverty, and humanitarian strain. Demonstrations reportedly declined amid sanctions and security constraints.[[15]](https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/HTI)

These reinforce, rather than shift, the high baseline instability fuse score (85.7/100), with youth (including 18-35 males) central to both perpetration and victimization via gangs/militias.

**Notable NGO/academic or UN-linked reports on Haiti’s youth situation (published or prominently covering 2025 events into 2026):** 

- HRW World Report 2026 (Haiti chapter) details 2025 deterioration, gang control, child recruitment/trafficking, school closures (1,600+ affecting 243,000+ students), and human rights abuses.[[16]](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/haiti)
- UN/OHCHR-BINUH joint report (Feb 20, 2026) on children trafficked by gangs, highlighting risks for youth in gang-controlled areas and calling for rehabilitation/reintegration.[[10]](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166954)
- UNICEF and related updates on 200%+ surge in child recruitment (2025 data) and displacement/education crises.[[11]](https://www.rescue.org/article/haitis-gang-violence-crisis-what-know-and-how-help)
- BTI 2026 Haiti Country Report (covers review period into 2025/early 2026) on insecurity, economic woes, and declining demonstrations.[[15]](https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/HTI)
- Other 2025-2026 outputs from IOM, HRW, and UN entities emphasize youth vulnerability, NEET-like risks, and the need for alternatives to gang involvement.[[17]](https://www.unicef.org/media/178391/file/Haiti-Humanitarian-Situation-Report-No.8,-31-December-2025.pdf)

**No reported changes to internet/mobile infrastructure access (shutdowns, major new rollouts, or coverage shifts) in the last 60 days.** General assessments note poor overall resilience and low 4G/5G penetration, with no election-related or other disruptions flagged for Haiti in monitoring (e.g., Access Now or Internet Society reports).[[18]](https://www.accessnow.org/campaign/2026-elections-and-internet-shutdowns-watch/)[[19]](https://pulse.internetsociety.org/en/reports/HT)

**Overall assessment:** The picture remains one of entrenched high instability, with no material improvement in youth unemployment metrics and continued acute risks for young men via gang recruitment, violence, and political delays. The GSF rollout introduces a potential new variable for security operations starting June 2026, but early indicators (persistent violence, youth-heavy gang membership) suggest limited immediate shift from the baseline. Sources are primarily UN, Reuters, HRW, and Haitian/international media outlets with April–May 2026 datelines.

**Here are relevant non-inference, Haiti-specific or LAC-regional data sources** (focusing on labor/unemployment, youth/economic indicators, and related areas). These complement the already-used sources like World Bank, ACLED, etc. Details are based on official sites and portals; most emphasize downloads over full APIs.[[1]](https://ayitistats.org/?lang=en)[[2]](https://ihsi.gouv.ht/)

- **Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique (IHSI)**: National statistics bureau. URL: https://ihsi.gouv.ht/. API: no (machine-readable downloads in tables/Excel/CSV formats for population projections, economic activity indicator (ICAE), inflation/CPI, GDP growth). Update frequency: quarterly (e.g., ICAE) or monthly (inflation); some annual. Auth: none.[[2]](https://ihsi.gouv.ht/)

- **Banque de la République d’Haïti (BRH)**: Central bank. URL: https://www.brh.ht/ (statistics section and rapports statistiques). API: no (Excel/XLS, PDF, and table downloads for monetary aggregates, external debt, exchange rates, inflation series, bons/interest rates). Update frequency: monthly/quarterly (e.g., monetary data, inflation notes). Auth: none.[[3]](https://www.brh.ht/)

- **Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (MEF)**: Finance ministry (data often aggregated via Ayitistats or joint releases). URL: https://www.mef.gouv.ht/ (or via Ayitistats). API: no (downloads via portals for economic/fiscal indicators). Update frequency: as released (often quarterly/annual). Auth: none.

- **Ayitistats**: Official public data portal aggregating IHSI, BRH, MEF, and other Haitian sources (includes unemployment, youth impacts, GDP by sector, MSMEs). URL: https://ayitistats.org/. API: no/partial (web downloads, format converter to CSV/Excel/JSON). Update frequency: regular (sources updated 2024–2025+). Auth: none.[[1]](https://ayitistats.org/?lang=en)

- **CEPALSTAT (ECLAC/United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean)**: Regional LAC database with Haiti country breakdowns (demographics, economy, labor, SDGs, poverty). URL: https://statistics.cepal.org/portal/cepalstat/index.html?lang=en. API: yes (Open Data/API for massive/developer access, plus online tools). Update frequency: ongoing/various (annual or periodic indicators). Auth: none/free.[[4]](https://www.cepal.org/en/data-and-statistics)

- **Haiti news RSS feeds** (reliable local/regional): Examples include Rezo Nòdwès RSS, Haitilibre.com RSS, The Haitian Times RSS, Haiti Liberté RSS, Juno7 RSS (curated lists available on Feedspot). URL examples via https://rss.feedspot.com/haiti_news_rss_feeds/. API: RSS feeds (machine-readable syndication; no dedicated API). Update frequency: daily/real-time. Auth: none. General Haiti-covering news APIs (e.g., NewsData.io or World News API monitoring Haitian sources) offer JSON endpoints with free/paid tiers.[[5]](https://rss.feedspot.com/haiti_news_rss_feeds/)

**Notes**: 
- No dedicated public APIs were identified for IHSI or BRH (reliant on downloads). 
- CEPALSTAT stands out for API access in the LAC region. 
- Unemployment/labor data is often limited or modeled at the national level (e.g., via IHSI aggregates or Ayitistats); youth-specific breakdowns are sparse in raw form. 
- For NGOs/think tanks with APIs, options like HDX (Humanitarian Data Exchange) provide Haiti crisis/poverty datasets with an API, but these are more supplementary. Always verify current access/terms directly, as formats and availability can evolve.