Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan & Pakistan · LBN

Lebanon

34
Composite priority
23.3%
Male youth unemployment · 2023
5.85M
Population · 2025
64.0%
Ages 15-64 · 2025
2.2 per 100k
Homicides · 2020

Location

33.89°, 35.51° · ISO LBN / LBOpen in OpenStreetMap →

Priority breakdown

0 = lowest · 100 = highest

Male youth unemployment23.3%· 60p
2023
Intentional homicides2.2 per 100k· 6p
2020
Internet access80.6%· 22p
2024
Mobile subscriptions74.0 per 100· 84p
2022
Phone ownership90.7%· 18p
2023
Electricity access100.0%· 0p
2024
AI usage20.2%· 21p
2024 · est.

Composite = mean of available dimensions, 5th-95th percentile clipped, direction-adjusted. Instability (unemployment, violence) raises score with value. Access (internet, devices, electricity, AI) raises score with absence.

Trajectory

20152026 · replay

How the scores moved.

Scores recomputed historically by replaying each year's indicator values through the current normalizer. Useful for direction, less so for absolute magnitude. World Bank series lag 1-2 years.

Fuse 6.8p vs 2021
42
Access gap 1.3p vs 2021
29
Impact 3.6p vs 2021
35

Latest signals

2026-07-05 18:00 UTC · run 2026-07-05T18

What the signals agent found, in the last ~60 days.

Live web search via Grok, scoped to this country. Structural indicators above lag by 1-2 years; this section is what changed recently.

Signals
**No new official government, ILO, or World Bank releases on youth (15-24) or male unemployment rates for Lebanon in the last 60 days (approx. May–early July 2026).** Latest modeled ILO/World Bank estimates remain from 2023 at around 22.7–23.55% total youth unemployment (ages 15-24), close to the provided baseline of 23.3% for males.[[1]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSLBN)[[2]](https://tradingeconomics.com/lebanon/unemployment-youth-total-percent-of-total-labor-force-ages-15-24-wb-data.html)[[3]](https://www.statista.com/statistics/812175/youth-unemployment-rate-in-lebanon/?srsltid=AfmBOooUL3B4m4EDxI9Z2aVK1UuGttl8ZKlh8tUbP9Nx299V-tf3y7IW)

Earlier data (e.g., 2022 CAS/ILO survey) showed much higher figures, with youth unemployment at 47.8% and overall unemployment at 29.6%. A May 1, 2026, analysis referenced youth (15–24) unemployment near 50%, with an LU4 rate (broader underutilization) at 64.2%, but this draws from prior estimates rather than fresh data.[[4]](https://blog.blominvestbank.com/ilo-lebanons-employment-ratio-falls-to-30-6-and-youth-unemployment-rises-to-47-8/)[[5]](https://enmaeya.com/en/news/69f1e4199145b2c59302281f-half-the-workforce-left-behind-lebanons-labor-market-by-the-numbers)

A February 2026 article similarly noted national unemployment around 30–35% and youth rates exceeding 50%.[[6]](https://www.baynetna.media/en/is-lebanons-economic-recovery-in-2026-a-myth-for-youth-employment/)

**Significant security and economic events (primarily the renewed Hezbollah–Israel conflict escalating from early March 2026) dominate recent developments and directly affect young men (18–35) through displacement, economic contraction, inflation, and livelihood losses.** 

- Fighting intensified from March 2026, with Israeli ground operations, airstrikes (including a major wave on April 8 killing over 300), and Hezbollah rocket/drone responses. As of late April 2026 updates: at least 2,489 killed and 7,719 injured in Lebanon since March 2; over 1 million internally displaced.[[7]](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-05/lebanon-38.php)
- Economic fallout includes war-related losses estimated at ~$3 billion (as of late April 2026), inflation rising above 20% YoY in April (up from ~12% in February), a 5% drop in foreign currency reserves (~$627 million) from mid-February to end-May, and projections of 0% GDP growth in 2026 if conflict persists.[[8]](https://timep.org/2026/06/16/no-bailout-in-sight-lebanons-economic-balancing-act/)[[9]](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/5/22/lebanons-economy-struggles-under-renewed-war-and-global-fuel-crisis)
- Broader impacts: Sharp deterioration in food security (1.24 million facing high acute insecurity per IPC); over 190 incidents of violence against healthcare workers (March–May); continued strain on an already fragile economy with no major bailout or reform progress.[[8]](https://timep.org/2026/06/16/no-bailout-in-sight-lebanons-economic-balancing-act/)[[10]](https://www.unocha.org/lebanon)

These factors represent a significant worsening of the instability picture relative to the 2023 baseline and 41.8/100 fuse score, as conflict-driven displacement, job/income losses, and price shocks disproportionately hit young working-age men, potentially increasing risks of militia recruitment (e.g., Hezbollah), informal economy reliance, or social unrest. No major protests, coup attempts, or new currency crises reported in the period.

**Notable NGO/academic reports on youth:** Limited new publications specifically from 2025 highlighted in recent results. A UNICEF report (Feb 28, 2025) addressed post-war impacts on children’s mental health, nutrition, and education. Other references point to ongoing education and labor market challenges but predate the latest 60-day window.[[11]](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/decline-childrens-mental-health-nutrition-and-education-after-war-lebanon-unicef)

**Internet/mobile infrastructure:** Positive development with Starlink satellite service licensing and rollout. The Lebanese Cabinet expanded licensing in March 2026 (citing war and displacement of >700,000) to allow sales to government entities, embassies, and NGOs for humanitarian/official use, with commercial/business rollout targeted for mid-May 2026 (full commercial possibly mid-June). This aims to improve access in underserved or conflict-affected areas. No shutdowns or coverage reductions reported.[[12]](https://smex.org/lebanese-government-expands-starlink-licensing-grants-telecom-minister-special-authority/)[[13]](https://leb.business/en/article/starlink-will-be-live-in-lebanon-by-mid-may-here-is-how-to-apply)

Overall, the dominant recent development is the March–ongoing 2026 conflict escalation, which has materially heightened youth instability risks through economic and security channels beyond the provided baseline. Monitor for any post-conflict data releases. Sources include World Bank/ILO data portals, Al Jazeera, TIMEP, Security Council Report, and others linked above.
Source discovery
**CAS (Central Administration of Statistics) – Lebanon’s national statistical office**  
- URL: http://www.cas.gov.lb/ (or direct sections like economic statistics/labour force)  
- API: No (no public API found)  
- Update frequency: Irregular/project-based (e.g., Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey 2018-2019 with microdata; follow-up LFS 2022)  
- Auth required: None (public downloads of PDFs, Excel tables, and some microdata files)  
- Notes: Provides unemployment, labor force, youth employment, and related indicators via downloadable machine-readable files for specific surveys.[[1]](https://researchrepository.ilo.org/esploro/fulltext/report/Lebanon-follow-up-Labour-Force-Survey/995218891002676?repId=12100564070002676&mId=13100848460002676&institution=41ILO_INST)[[2]](https://blog.blominvestbank.com/cas-ilo-unemployment-is-at-29-6-and-youth-unemployment-at-47-8-in-lebanon/)

**Banque du Liban (BDL) – Economic & Financial Data**  
- URL: https://www.bdl.gov.lb/economicandfinancialdata.php (or statistics/research section)  
- API: No (no public API found)  
- Update frequency: Regular (monthly/quarterly economic indicators, financial statistics)  
- Auth required: None (public tables and data series downloads)  
- Notes: Covers economic indicators relevant to youth employment and instability (e.g., broader economic context); downloadable series but primarily web tables.[[3]](https://www.bdl.gov.lb/economicandfinancialdata.php)

**UN ESCWA United Nations Data Hub for the Arab Region (UNDHA)**  
- URL: https://data.unescwa.org/ (or https://www.unescwa.org/portal/data)  
- API: No dedicated public API confirmed for the hub (web portal with search/visualization/downloads; related Arab portals have limited API mentions)  
- Update frequency: Ongoing/regular updates from member states and sources  
- Auth required: None (free, unrestricted public access)  
- Notes: Regional database with country breakdowns for Arab states including Lebanon; supports downloads of economic, social, SDG, and labor-related indicators.[[4]](https://www.unescwa.org/news/escwa-launches-first-regional-data-portal)[[5]](https://www.unescwa.org/portal/data)

**Arab Development Portal (ADP, associated with ESCWA/UN)**  
- URL: Various ESCWA-linked portals (e.g., ksa.unescwa.org or search “Arab Development Portal”)  
- API: Partial/yes in some datasets (explicit API query support noted for certain ADP datasets)  
- Update frequency: Regular (development indicators)  
- Auth required: None/free (public access)  
- Notes: Regional coverage for Arab countries with country-level data; complements ESCWA hub.[[6]](https://ksa.unescwa.org/Datacatalog/Dataset/third-parties/worldpolicycenter/How)

**News APIs with Lebanon coverage (e.g., NewsAPI.org, World News API)**  
- URL: https://newsapi.org/ or https://worldnewsapi.com/docs/news-sources/lebanon-news-api/  
- API: Yes (REST APIs for news search/headlines)  
- Update frequency: Real-time/near real-time  
- Auth required: Free tier available (rate-limited); paid for higher volume  
- Notes: Reliable for monitoring Lebanon-specific news on youth, instability, economy; filter by country/source. General regional coverage possible.[[7]](https://worldnewsapi.com/docs/news-sources/lebanon-news-api/)[[8]](https://newsapi.org/)

**Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX) – Lebanon crisis/response datasets**  
- URL: https://data.humdata.org/group/lbn  
- API: Partial (CKAN-based platform with API access for datasets)  
- Update frequency: Frequent (user/organization contributions)  
- Auth required: None (public downloads; API for programmatic access)  
- Notes: NGO/think tank and org-sourced data on Lebanon crises, poverty, displacement—useful for instability tracking.[[9]](https://data.humdata.org/group/lbn)

Additional notes: No strong public APIs were identified for core national sources (CAS/BDL), which rely on manual or bulk downloads. Regional options like ESCWA fill gaps for MENA coverage. Always verify current access/status on sites, as availability can change. These complement the listed existing sources (e.g., World Bank, ACLED).

Full run history: /sources

Trends · 2014–2026

Each dimension, over time.

Male youth unemployment

%
18.423.228.02014202323.3%

Intentional homicides

per 100k
1.73.14.5201420202.2

Internet access

%
72.277.883.42014202480.6%

Mobile subscriptions

per 100
67.071.475.82014202274.0

Phone ownership

%
No data

Electricity access

%
99.299.8100.520142024100.0%

AI usage

%
17.819.521.22014202420.2%

Population

people
5640792.36087433.56534074.7201420255849421.0

Working-age share

%
62.465.568.52014202564.0%

Provenance

Where the numbers come from.

Every dimension in the priority score has a public, citable source. Window 2014–2026. Signed-input pipeline lands with v2.