Lebanon

**No new official government, ILO, or World Bank data releases on Lebanon’s youth (15-24) or male unemployment rates appear in the last 60 days (late June–late August 2026).** The most recent modeled/national estimate remains the baseline figure of 23.3% for male youth unemployment (15-24) in 2023.[[1]](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099142207012235024/pdf/IDU0ed5c6511061360457b0b9e904af7f66dacc9.pdf)[[2]](https://donnees.banquemondiale.org/indicateur/SL.UEM.1524.MA.ZS)

The ILO’s *Global Employment Trends for Youth 2026* (published August 11, 2026) reports regional figures for the Arab States (youth unemployment 26.2% in 2025, up or stable in most subregions) but provides no Lebanon-specific update.[[3]](https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-08/9789220437612_PDFA_Web_ENG.pdf)[[3]](https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-08/9789220437612_PDFA_Web_ENG.pdf) World Bank gender data (2026 edition, data as of April 2026) reaffirms the 2023 Lebanon male youth unemployment rate of 23.3%.[[1]](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099142207012235024/pdf/IDU0ed5c6511061360457b0b9e904af7f66dacc9.pdf) No evidence of a significant shift from the baseline.

**Significant political and security developments in late June 2026 directly affect young men (18-35):** On or around June 27, 2026, Lebanon, Israel, and the US announced a US-brokered framework agreement aimed at lasting peace, phased Israeli withdrawal from occupied southern areas, Lebanese Armed Forces assuming territorial control, and disarmament/dismantling of non-state armed groups (notably Hezbollah).[[4]](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/27/world/middleeast/lebanon-israel-deal-divisions-protests-beirut.html)[[5]](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/6/28/in-lebanon-framework-agreement-signed-with-israel-spurs-protest-criticism)

This triggered immediate protests and riots, primarily by Hezbollah supporters in Beirut and southern suburbs: motorbike convoys waving flags, road blockades with burning tires, clashes with security forces (tear gas used), and property damage. Hezbollah lawmakers warned that enforcement risked civil war.[[6]](https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hykqyj3ggx)[[7]](https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5289094-hezbollah-supporters-take-streets-beirut-protest-israel-deal)[[8]](https://www.ft.com/content/5e138e21-9e72-4e3d-b240-c5c3c39355da?syn-25a6b1a6=1) These events (June 27–29, 2026) heightened risks of unrest, militia recruitment or involvement, and intra-communal tensions for young men.

Hostilities have continued/escalated into August 2026. As of August 17, 2026, at least 4,346 deaths and 12,303 injuries were recorded since March 2, 2026 (including hundreds of women and children), with 168 conflict incidents (airstrikes, shelling, etc.) in the prior week alone in southern and Nabatieh areas; 351,558 people remained displaced.[[9]](https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-50-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-17-august-2026) This ongoing conflict creates economic shocks, displacement, and livelihood disruptions disproportionately affecting youth.

**Notable NGO/academic reports from 2025 (with some ongoing relevance or recent references):** A Secours Islamique France report (survey of >1,600 vulnerable Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian youth aged ~10-24 conducted June–July 2025) highlights high NEET rates, youth unemployment (e.g., 39% among out-of-school respondents overall; 49% for Syrians, 24% for Lebanese; gender gaps with young women faring worse), informal employment, and barriers to education/labor markets.[[10]](https://www.secours-islamique.org/images/ressources/plaidoyer/NOTE_LIBAN_FR-final.pdf)[[10]](https://www.secours-islamique.org/images/ressources/plaidoyer/NOTE_LIBAN_FR-final.pdf)

UNICEF Lebanon has issued multiple updates and reports in 2025–2026 on youth impacts (e.g., “The Future of Lebanon’s Children” foresight analysis, October 2025; youth-focused rapid assessments amid conflict; programs reaching tens of thousands with skills/training). GAGE/ODI published several 2025 participatory research pieces on adolescent/youth transitions, education, and agency in Lebanon’s crises.[[11]](https://www.unicef.org/lebanon/reports/future-lebanons-children)[[12]](https://gage.odi.org/lebanon/) These underscore persistent vulnerabilities but predate or contextualize the June–August 2026 events.

**Internet/mobile infrastructure:** No shutdowns reported. Instead, restoration efforts are underway following conflict damage. On August 27, 2026, Touch announced restoration of service to 49 mobile stations across South Lebanon and Western Bekaa (areas including Nabatieh, Tyre, Bint Jbeil, etc.), with further repairs prioritized under army escorts.[[13]](https://en.akhbaralyawm.com/news/192273/Touch-restores-service-to-49-mobile-stations-across-South-Lebanon,-Western-Bekaa) The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) has focused on regulatory actions (e.g., removing illegal networks, FTTH deployment policies, spectrum refarming consultations) in August 2026.[[14]](https://www.tra.gov.lb/News)

**Assessment relative to baseline:** No unemployment data shifts the 23.3% (2023) figure or the 41.8/100 instability fuse score materially. However, the June 27, 2026, framework agreement, immediate Hezbollah-aligned protests/riots, warnings of civil war risk, and continued hostilities/displacement into mid-August 2026 represent a notable escalation in political/security risks. These could increase militia dynamics, economic strain, and instability for young men (18-35), warranting close monitoring for shifts in the fuse score.

**CAS (Central Administration of Statistics) Lebanon**  
- URL: https://www.cas.gov.lb/ (publications, surveys, national accounts, labor force sections)  
- API: No  
- Update frequency: Varies (monthly CPI/inflation; periodic/annual labor force surveys and national accounts, e.g., 2018-2019 LFHLCS and 2022 follow-up with unemployment/labor data by age/sex)  
- Auth: None (public XLSX/PDF machine-readable downloads)[[1]](https://odin.opendatawatch.com/Report/countryProfile/LBN?year=2024)[[2]](https://www.cas.gov.lb/)

**Banque du Liban (BdL) Economic & Financial Data**  
- URL: https://www.bdl.gov.lb/economicandfinancialdata.php  
- API: No  
- Update frequency: Varies by series (monthly/quarterly/annual monetary aggregates, balance sheets, external sector, interest rates, etc.)  
- Auth: None (public data series/tables, often downloadable)[[3]](https://www.bdl.gov.lb/economicandfinancialdata.php)

**UN ESCWA Arab Development Portal / Data Hub**  
- URL: https://data.unescwa.org/ (or https://www.unescwa.org/portal/data)  
- API: No/partial (data catalog, country breakdowns, visualizations, and downloads for Arab region incl. Lebanon; covers economic, social, labor, SDGs)  
- Update frequency: Varies/ongoing (national and regional sources)  
- Auth: None (free public access)[[4]](https://www.unescwa.org/portal/data)[[5]](https://data.unescwa.org/)

**Lebanon24 RSS Feeds**  
- URL: https://www.lebanon24.com/Rss (category-specific feeds e.g., Lebanon, economy)  
- API: No (RSS feeds for structured/news data ingestion)  
- Update frequency: Real-time/as published  
- Auth: None[[6]](https://www.lebanon24.com/Rss)

Additional notes: National and central bank sources emphasize XLSX downloads over APIs; ESCWA provides strong regional MENA coverage with Lebanon breakdowns. No prominent public APIs or paid tiers were identified for these Lebanon-specific or regional sources. Other regional options (e.g., AfDB or ADB) have limited Lebanon relevance compared to ESCWA.