Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan & Pakistan · LBY
Libya
Location
Priority breakdown
0 = lowest · 100 = highest
Composite = mean of available dimensions, 5th-95th percentile clipped, direction-adjusted. Instability (unemployment, violence) raises score with value. Access (internet, devices, electricity, AI) raises score with absence.
Trajectory
2015–2026 · replay
How the scores moved.
Scores recomputed historically by replaying each year's indicator values through the current normalizer. Useful for direction, less so for absolute magnitude. World Bank series lag 1-2 years.
Latest signals
2026-06-29 09:07 UTC · run 2026-06-29T09
What the signals agent found, in the last ~60 days.
Live web search via Grok, scoped to this country. Structural indicators above lag by 1-2 years; this section is what changed recently.
Signals
**No new official government, ILO, or World Bank releases on Libya’s youth (15-24) or male youth unemployment were identified in the last 60 days (roughly late April–late June 2026).** Latest modeled ILO/World Bank estimates remain in the ~50% range for total youth unemployment (15-24) in 2025 (e.g., 50.06% or 50.057% cited across FRED, Macrotrends, and World Bank data portals; one 2024 figure at 49.52%).[[1]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSLBY)[[2]](https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/lby/libya/youth-unemployment-rate)[[3]](https://tradingeconomics.com/libya/unemployment-youth-total-percent-of-total-labor-force-ages-15-24-modeled-ilo-estimate-wb-data.html) The provided baseline of 41.9% for males (national, 2025) aligns with available disaggregated indicators but shows no updates. An October 2025 report noted ~51% youth unemployment (~1.1 million people) as context for a Ministry of Economy and Trade scheme, but nothing newer.[[4]](https://maghrebi.org/2025/10/01/libya-launches-new-plan-to-tackle-widespread-youth-unemployment/) **Key events affecting young men (18-35) in the period center on localized armed clashes and youth-involved protests tied to economic grievances and migration:** - **May 8, 2026, Zawiya clashes**: Armed fighting erupted between GNU-affiliated security forces (e.g., Security Threats Combat Apparatus) and local armed groups near Libya’s largest oil refinery. Heavy weapons and indiscriminate fire were used in residential areas; at least three civilians killed and multiple injuries reported (including a refinery security officer). The refinery shut down temporarily (resumed ~May 10) with an emergency declared. UNSMIL condemned the violence and warned of risks to civilians, infrastructure, and wider destabilization. Earlier clashes occurred around May 1. These incidents involve militia/security actors often drawn from young men and highlight ongoing fragmentation.[[5]](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-06/libya-68.php)[[6]](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/unsmil-statement-on-the-escalation-of-violence-in-zawiya)[[7]](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/emergency-declared-libyas-zawiya-refinery-amid-clashes-near-facility-two-2026-05-08/) - **“No to settlement” protests (ongoing since ~April 2026, escalating in June)**: Weekly demonstrations in Tripoli’s Janzour neighborhood (near UN offices) under slogans like “No to settlement,” “No to demographic change,” and “Libya for Libyans.” Protesters blame migrants (“infiltrators”) for economic woes, demand UNHCR expulsion, and oppose EU migration deals. The June 4 protest involved sand piles at gates and breaching the UNSMIL compound exterior; security forces did not intervene. The GNU Interior Minister met activists on June 8 and voiced support. These reflect youth demographic and economic anxieties.[[8]](https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/libya-eu-rival-authorities-intensify-xenophobic-and-racist-crackdown-on-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya-as-eu-seeks-to-deepen-ties/)[[9]](https://libyaobserver.ly/news/libyas-anti-settlement-protests-demographic-fears-and-migration-panic)[[8]](https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/libya-eu-rival-authorities-intensify-xenophobic-and-racist-crackdown-on-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya-as-eu-seeks-to-deepen-ties/) Positive counterpoint: On April 29, 2026, the UN in Libya launched its first Youth Advisory Team (YAT)—12 young women and men (western, eastern, southern regions) for a April 2026–March 2027 cycle—to provide youth input on UN analysis, advocacy, and programming.[[10]](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/press-releases-unsmil)[[11]](https://libya.un.org/en) **NGO/academic reports**: No major new standalone 2025/2026 youth-specific reports surfaced in the search window. Relevant ongoing or recent items include the BTI 2026 Libya Country Report (broader governance/CSO context), UNDP’s “Resilient Youth for Brighter Libya” initiatives (2025 cohort of ambassadors and programs), and references to an earlier UNSMIL youth report (July 2025). A Libyan National Economic and Social Development Board national youth survey (focused on ages 15-34, ~38% of population) dates to earlier work (finalized ~2023).[[12]](https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/LBY)[[13]](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2025-08/undp-ly-youth-catalogue-2025.pdf) **Internet/mobile infrastructure**: No shutdowns or major coverage disruptions reported in the last 60 days (or specifically flagged for Libya in Q1 2026 summaries). High penetration persists: ~14.9 million mobile connections (~199% of population, end-2025 data) and ~88.5% internet usage (~6.62 million users). 4G coverage is strong in many areas; 5G remains minimal (<1%). Ongoing modernization includes phased shutdown of outdated exchanges (first phase decommissioning ~70 by Hatif Libya/LPTIC, targeting completion by 2026) alongside fiber/mobile expansion and 4G/5G rollout.[[14]](https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2026-libya)[[15]](https://pulse.internetsociety.org/en/reports/ly/) **Overall assessment**: These developments (localized violence with economic ripple effects via the oil facility and recurring youth-driven protests over jobs/migration) reinforce the baseline of extreme instability (fuse score 100/100) without a dramatic shift. Economic pressures on young men remain acute amid militia activity and protests; positive youth engagement via the UN YAT is a minor counter-signal. No indicators suggest unemployment relief or infrastructure blackouts that would alter the picture. Sources are primarily UN, Reuters, Amnesty, and data portals from the period.
Source discovery
**Libya-specific or relevant MENA/AP data sources (non-inference, focusing on unemployment/labor, youth employment, economic indicators, crisis/poverty tracking, and news).** These supplement the already-used sources (World Bank, ACLED, etc.). Details on API/auth/update frequency are based on site descriptions and typical access patterns where explicit info is limited; many government portals emphasize downloads (CSV/Excel/PDF) over programmatic APIs.[[1]](https://opendata.gia.gov.ly/english/index.html)[[2]](https://cbl.gov.ly/en/economic_indicators/) - **Bureau of Statistics and Census (BSC Libya, مصلحة الإحصاء والتعداد)**: https://bsc.ly/ — National stats office; labor/unemployment and population data via reports or linked portals. No public API evident (reports/downloads only). Update frequency: irregular (census/survey-based, e.g., population stats). Auth: none (public site).[[3]](https://globaledge.msu.edu/global-resources/resource/16676)[[4]](https://bsc.ly/) - **Libya Open Data Portal (GIA)**: https://opendata.gia.gov.ly/english/index.html — Government open data portal with CSV/JSON/API formats from institutions; covers economic/labor topics. API: yes (explicitly listed alongside CSV/JSON). Update frequency: varies by dataset (government releases). Auth: none (public, for academic/commercial use).[[1]](https://opendata.gia.gov.ly/english/index.html) - **Central Bank of Libya (CBL) Economic Indicators**: https://cbl.gov.ly/en/economic_indicators/ — Official CPI, banking/financial indicators, revenue/expenditures, foreign trade (relevant to youth employment/economic context). API: no (PDF/data table downloads). Update frequency: quarterly or as released (e.g., H1/Q1/Q2/Q3 reports). Auth: none.[[2]](https://cbl.gov.ly/en/economic_indicators/) - **African Development Bank (AfDB) Data Portals (incl. Libya Data Portal and Open Data for Africa)**: https://libya.opendataforafrica.org/ and https://dataportal.opendataforafrica.org/ — Country breakdowns for Libya (economic, social, infrastructure indicators); supports MENA/Africa focus. API: partial/no (primarily search/visualize/download tools; some bulk access). Update frequency: periodic (Bank statistical releases). Auth: none (free public access).[[5]](https://dataportal.opendataforafrica.org/ydixvvd)[[6]](https://www.re3data.org/repository/r3d100011929) - **UN ESCWA Arab Development Portal**: https://data.unescwa.org/ — Regional database with Libya country pages, SDG tracking (incl. decent work/economic growth, poverty, labor indicators), data catalog, and multi-country MENA breakdowns (covers Afghanistan/Pakistan-adjacent themes via broader Arab data). API: no (visualization, search, download tools; data catalog). Update frequency: ongoing (sources include UN/member states, with recent indicators like 2024–2026). Auth: none (free public hub).[[7]](https://data.unescwa.org/)[[7]](https://data.unescwa.org/) - **Libya News RSS Feeds (aggregated reliable sources)**: e.g., via Feedspot lists (Libya Al Salam, Libya Al-Ahrar, Libya Herald, UNSMIL, etc.) or direct sites like https://rss.feedspot.com/libya_news_rss_feeds/. API: no (standard RSS). Update frequency: daily/high (news-driven). Auth: none.[[8]](https://rss.feedspot.com/libya_news_rss_feeds/) No strong public data APIs were identified from specific NGOs/think tanks for Libya-focused youth instability/poverty/crisis monitoring beyond broader sources like those already in use. Regional portals (AfDB, ESCWA) are the strongest for structured country breakdowns. Verify current access/details directly, as government sites in conflict-affected areas can change.
Full run history: /sources
Trends · 2014–2026
Each dimension, over time.
Male youth unemployment
%Intentional homicides
per 100kInternet access
%Mobile subscriptions
per 100Phone ownership
%Electricity access
%AI usage
%Population
peopleWorking-age share
%Provenance
Where the numbers come from.
Every dimension in the priority score has a public, citable source. Window 2014–2026. Signed-input pipeline lands with v2.
| Dimension | Indicator | Source | Latest data | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Unemployment (15-24, male) | Male youth unemployment, 15-24 (% male labor force) SL.UEM.1524.MA.ZS | World Bank · ILOSTAT modeled estimates | 2025 | ↑ priority |
Unemployment (15+, male) | Male unemployment, 15+ (% male labor force) SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS | World Bank · ILOSTAT modeled estimates | 2025 | ↑ priority |
Violence | Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 | UNODC · via World Bank | 2023 | ↑ priority |
Internet access | Individuals using the Internet (% of population) IT.NET.USER.ZS | ITU · via World Bank | 2024 | ↓ priority |
Mobile subscriptions | Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) IT.CEL.SETS.P2 | ITU · via World Bank | 2024 | ↓ priority |
Electricity access | Access to electricity (% of population) EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS | IEA / World Bank Tracking SDG7 | 2023 | ↓ priority |
AI usage Estimate · proxy | AI tool usage (surveyed) | DataReportal / GWI (survey) % of internet users who used any AI tool in the past month (DataReportal / GWI), converted to % of population using internet penetration. | 2025 | ↓ priority |
Population (context) | Population, total SP.POP.TOTL | UN Population Division · via World Bank | 2024 | context |
Working-age share (context) | Population ages 15-64 (% of total) SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS | UN Population Division · via World Bank | 2024 | context |
Phone ownership | Individuals owning a mobile phone (% of population) | ITU (via Our World in Data) | 2024 | ↓ priority |
Freedom (intervention axis) | Freedom in the World — total score 0-100 (higher = more free) | Freedom House (via Our World in Data) | 2025 | ↓ priority |
- Unemployment (15-24, male)↑ priority
Male youth unemployment, 15-24 (% male labor force)
SL.UEM.1524.MA.ZS
World Bank · ILOSTAT modeled estimates
Latest data · 2025
- Unemployment (15+, male)↑ priority
Male unemployment, 15+ (% male labor force)
SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS
World Bank · ILOSTAT modeled estimates
Latest data · 2025
- Violence↑ priority
Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)
VC.IHR.PSRC.P5
Latest data · 2023
- Internet access↓ priority
Individuals using the Internet (% of population)
IT.NET.USER.ZS
Latest data · 2024
- Mobile subscriptions↓ priority
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
IT.CEL.SETS.P2
Latest data · 2024
- Electricity access↓ priority
Access to electricity (% of population)
EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS
IEA / World Bank Tracking SDG7
Latest data · 2023
- AI usage↓ priority
AI tool usage (surveyed)
Latest data · 2025
% of internet users who used any AI tool in the past month (DataReportal / GWI), converted to % of population using internet penetration.
- Population (context)context
Population, total
SP.POP.TOTL
UN Population Division · via World Bank
Latest data · 2024
- Working-age share (context)context
Population ages 15-64 (% of total)
SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS
UN Population Division · via World Bank
Latest data · 2024
- Phone ownership↓ priority
Individuals owning a mobile phone (% of population)
Latest data · 2024
- Freedom (intervention axis)↓ priority
Freedom in the World — total score 0-100 (higher = more free)
Freedom House (via Our World in Data)
Latest data · 2025