Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan & Pakistan · MAR
Morocco
Location
Priority breakdown
0 = lowest · 100 = highest
Composite = mean of available dimensions, 5th-95th percentile clipped, direction-adjusted. Instability (unemployment, violence) raises score with value. Access (internet, devices, electricity, AI) raises score with absence.
Trajectory
2015–2026 · replay
How the scores moved.
Scores recomputed historically by replaying each year's indicator values through the current normalizer. Useful for direction, less so for absolute magnitude. World Bank series lag 1-2 years.
Latest signals
2026-09-02 09:07 UTC · run 2026-09-02T09
What the signals agent found, in the last ~60 days.
Live web search via Grok, scoped to this country. Structural indicators above lag by 1-2 years; this section is what changed recently.
Signals
**No major new government, ILO, or World Bank releases on youth (15-24) or male unemployment in Morocco appear in the last 60 days (roughly early July to early September 2026).** Existing 2025–early 2026 data continues to be referenced, showing persistent challenges that align closely with or slightly exceed the baseline of 21.7% youth unemployment (15-24 male, national) for 2025.[[1]](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Morocco/youth_unemployment/)[[2]](https://tradingeconomics.com/morocco/youth-unemployment-rate) - World Bank-modeled annual youth unemployment (15-24) stood at 21.88% in 2025 (down slightly from 22.37% in 2024).[[1]](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Morocco/youth_unemployment/)[[3]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSMAR) - HCP (Haut-Commissariat au Plan) data, often cited in domestic reporting, shows higher figures such as 37.2% youth unemployment (15-24) for 2025 (up from 36.7% in 2024), with Q1 2026 at 29.2% (vs. national 10.8%). Q2 2026 youth unemployment reached 22.90% (down from 23.40% in Q1).[[2]](https://tradingeconomics.com/morocco/youth-unemployment-rate)[[4]](https://lematin.ma/monde/emploi-des-jeunes-le-chomage-mondial-remonte-a-124/361112) - Broader indicators: National unemployment ~9.5–13% in 2025–Q2 2026; NEET rate for ages 15–29 around 33.6% (~2.9 million youth), with ~72% women and sharp rural/urban and gender gaps. Northern Africa regional youth unemployment was 22.6% in 2025 per the ILO’s August 2026 “Global Employment Trends for Youth” report.[[5]](https://www.ilo.org/y-neet-morocco)[[6]](https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-08/9789220437612_PDFA_Web_ENG.pdf)[[7]](https://drh.ma/rapports-rapport-oit-2026-67-millions-de-jeunes-au-chomage-et-257-millions-hors-emploi-ou-formation/) These figures indicate structural issues (skills mismatches, low formal job creation, informality) but no sharp deterioration or improvement in the most recent period. The baseline youth unemployment picture remains largely unchanged. **Significant political/security/economic events affecting young men (18-35) in the last 60 days:** None identified as new or escalating. The major 2025 GenZ 212 (or Gen Z 212) protests—sparked in late September 2025 by healthcare failures and broader grievances over youth unemployment (~35–37%), public services, corruption, and World Cup spending—were suppressed by early-mid October 2025, with reports of deaths (at least three), injuries (~400), arrests (thousands), and property damage.[[8]](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/arab-springs-digital-heirs-morocco)[[9]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Moroccan_Gen_Z_protests)[[10]](https://www.alestiklal.net/en/article/morocco-s-gen-z-is-rising-are-arab-regimes-paying-attention) - As of early September 2026 coverage, the movement’s legacy includes ongoing discussion of youth discontent, government pressure on Prime Minister Akhannouch’s administration, and speculation around September 2026 elections, but no widespread new protests, coup attempts, militia activity, or acute economic shocks (e.g., currency crisis) in the prior 60 days.[[11]](https://www.alestiklal.net/en/article/deaths-and-injuries-in-morocco-protests-is-akhannouch-s-government-on-the-line)[[10]](https://www.alestiklal.net/en/article/morocco-s-gen-z-is-rising-are-arab-regimes-paying-attention) - Economic context remains one of gradual job creation (e.g., ~193,000 net jobs in 2025, concentrated in services/construction/industry) that has not sufficiently reached youth, alongside high underemployment and NEET rates. No militia recruitment or major instability triggers noted recently.[[4]](https://lematin.ma/monde/emploi-des-jeunes-le-chomage-mondial-remonte-a-124/361112) These events underscore youth frustration but appear contained relative to the baseline instability fuse score (36.8/100); they do not indicate an immediate sharp upward shift. **Notable NGO or academic reports on Morocco’s youth situation published in 2025:** Several 2025–2026 reports (some drawing on 2025 data) were referenced or released earlier in 2026, with limited brand-new publications strictly in the last 60 days. Examples include: - ILO/HCP Y-NEET analysis (profiled February 2026, based on earlier data): ~2.9 million NEETs (15–29), ~33.6% rate, severe gender/rural gaps.[[5]](https://www.ilo.org/y-neet-morocco) - Policy Center for the New South and African Development Bank references (June 2026) reiterating 2025 unemployment (13% national, 37.2% youth) and NEET figures (~2.94 million).[[12]](https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/projects-and-operations/morocco_-_ar_-_cap-competences_2030-_for_publication.pdf) - Sunergia/L’Économiste youth survey (data from mid-2025, published early 2026): Highlights unemployment at 37.2% (15-24), low job satisfaction, and priorities around employment/health/education.[[13]](https://groupe-sunergia.com/market-insights/enquete-leconomiste-sunergia-sur-la-jeunesse-marocaine-2025/) - Afrobarometer and other analyses (2025 data releases into 2026) note youth education gains alongside labor market exclusion and emigration interest.[[14]](https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/AD1004-Youth-like-Moroccos-direction-even-as-jobs-remain-scarce-and-interest-in-emigration-grows-Afrobarometer-20june25.pdf) No reports from the immediate last 60 days appear to dramatically alter the baseline. **Changes to internet/mobile infrastructure access:** No shutdowns or coverage reductions reported. Positive/ongoing expansions instead: - 5G rollout (launched November 2025 by major operators) expanding to ~100+ cities initially, with targets of 45% population coverage by end-2026 and 85% by 2030; ~3.22 million 5G subscribers by mid-2026 alongside 4G maturity.[[15]](https://leseco.ma/business/telecoms-au-maroc-la-data-a-pris-le-pouvoir.html)[[16]](https://almassaa.com/117118/) - Rural broadband phase 1 nearly complete (coverage in ~10,690 of 10,740 targeted areas); phase 2 adding ~2,000 more localities by 2026, with satellite for remote spots. Overall internet subscriptions ~41 million (111.5% penetration); mobile ~57 million (154.9% penetration) as of Q1 2026.[[17]](https://en.7news.ma/morocco-rural-internet-rollout-nearly-complete-as-government-targets-85-5g-coverage-by-2030/)[[18]](https://www.laverite.ma/marche-telecoms-maroc-t1-2026-anrt/) - Internet freedom rated relatively free/low censorship (score ~6/100, stable trend) with no major incidents flagged recently.[[19]](https://voidly.ai/ma) **Overall assessment:** No developments in the last 60 days appear to significantly shift the youth instability picture from the provided baseline. High structural youth unemployment/NEET rates persist (with HCP figures notably higher than modeled aggregates), and 2025 protest legacies highlight ongoing risks of discontent among young men, but recent months show continuity rather than acute escalation, new data shocks, or infrastructure disruptions. Continued monitoring of HCP quarterly releases and pre-election dynamics (September 2026) is warranted. Sources primarily include World Bank/ILO aggregates, HCP via domestic media (e.g., Le Matin, Yabiladi), and analyses from Carnegie, Washington Institute, and others.
Source discovery
**Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP) / Bases de Données Statistiques (BDS) and data.gov.ma integration** - URL: https://bds.hcp.ma (HCP databases); https://www.data.gov.ma (national Open Data portal, HCP organization/datasets) - API: Partial (CKAN Action API on data.gov.ma for dataset discovery/search/download metadata; HCP statistical database feeds into automated portal updates) - Update frequency: Quarterly (labor/employment data) to annual; automated regular updates via HCP integration - Auth: None (public downloads in XLSX/CSV; CKAN API read access free) - Notes: Primary source for Morocco unemployment, labor force participation, youth employment (15-24 age breakdowns), activity rates, and related indicators.[[1]](https://www.data.gov.ma/fr/actualites/publication-automatiques-des-donnees-des-apis-du-hcp)[[2]](https://data.gov.ma/data/fr/organization/haut-commissariat-au-plan?groups=emploi&page=2) **Bank Al-Maghrib (Central Bank) Developer APIs** - URL: https://apihelpdesk.centralbankofmorocco.ma/ (API portal and docs) - API: Yes (REST APIs for exchange rates, Treasury bill auctions, monetary policy operations, and related economic/financial series) - Update frequency: Daily (e.g., exchange rates, auctions) to periodic for broader indicators - Auth: Free registration (API key required) - Notes: Useful for economic context tied to youth employment/instability (growth, fiscal, labor market references in reports); complements HCP labor data.[[3]](https://apihelpdesk.centralbankofmorocco.ma/) **ESCWA (UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia) Data Hub/Portal** - URL: https://data.unescwa.org/ or https://www.unescwa.org/portal/data (Arab region data hub) - API: No/partial (web portal with search, visualizations, dashboards, and bulk downloads; no documented public developer API) - Update frequency: Periodic (as national data received/processed; country profiles and SDG-related series) - Auth: None (free public access, downloads, and exports) - Notes: Country breakdowns for Arab/MENA states including Morocco; covers demographics, labor/economic indicators, SDGs relevant to youth instability.[[4]](https://www.unescwa.org/portal/data) **African Development Bank (AfDB) Data Portal / Open Data for Africa (Morocco)** - URL: http://dataportal.afdb.org/ or https://morocco.opendataforafrica.org/ (AfDB/Morocco-specific) - API: Partial/no (interactive portal, downloads, visualizations, and some microdata catalog endpoints; limited documented public REST API for core indicators) - Update frequency: As operations/data releases occur (annual compendiums, country profiles) - Auth: None (public access) - Notes: Socio-economic indicators, operations data, and country profiles for Morocco and North Africa; useful regional context alongside MENA coverage.[[5]](http://dataportals.org/portal/morocco_opendataforafrica) **Arab Barometer (survey data on attitudes/values)** - URL: https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/ - API: No (public downloads after short registration form; analysis tool available online) - Update frequency: Periodic waves (typically every 1–2 years; latest waves include Morocco) - Auth: None (free after brief form for usage tracking) - Notes: Nationally representative surveys on social/political/economic attitudes in MENA (including Morocco); highly relevant for youth perceptions, instability drivers, and non-official indicators.[[6]](https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/) **Additional notes on news/RSS and other sources**: Reliable Moroccan news outlets (e.g., Hespress, Aujourd’hui le Maroc, or others listed on aggregator sites like Feedspot) often provide RSS feeds for monitoring events/instability signals. These are typically no-API (RSS polling), near-real-time updates, and require no auth, but are secondary to structured statistical sources. Finance ministry or other data often routes through data.gov.ma. All listed sources are publicly accessible and focus on non-inference/raw or official data. Verify current endpoints/status directly as portals evolve.
Full run history: /sources
Trends · 2014–2026
Each dimension, over time.
Male youth unemployment
%Intentional homicides
per 100kInternet access
%Mobile subscriptions
per 100Phone ownership
%Electricity access
%AI usage
%Population
peopleWorking-age share
%Provenance
Where the numbers come from.
Every dimension in the priority score has a public, citable source. Window 2014–2026. Signed-input pipeline lands with v2.
| Dimension | Indicator | Source | Latest data | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Unemployment (15-24, male) | Male youth unemployment, 15-24 (% male labor force) SL.UEM.1524.MA.ZS | World Bank · ILOSTAT modeled estimates | 2025 | ↑ priority |
Unemployment (15+, male) | Male unemployment, 15+ (% male labor force) SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS | World Bank · ILOSTAT modeled estimates | 2025 | ↑ priority |
Violence | Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 | UNODC · via World Bank | 2023 | ↑ priority |
Internet access | Individuals using the Internet (% of population) IT.NET.USER.ZS | ITU · via World Bank | 2024 | ↓ priority |
Mobile subscriptions | Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) IT.CEL.SETS.P2 | ITU · via World Bank | 2024 | ↓ priority |
Electricity access | Access to electricity (% of population) EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS | IEA / World Bank Tracking SDG7 | 2024 | ↓ priority |
AI usage Estimate · proxy | AI tool usage (surveyed) | DataReportal / GWI (survey) % of internet users who used any AI tool in the past month (DataReportal / GWI), converted to % of population using internet penetration. | 2025 | ↓ priority |
Population (context) | Population, total SP.POP.TOTL | UN Population Division · via World Bank | 2025 | context |
Working-age share (context) | Population ages 15-64 (% of total) SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS | UN Population Division · via World Bank | 2025 | context |
Phone ownership | Individuals owning a mobile phone (% of population) | ITU (via Our World in Data) | 2025 | ↓ priority |
Freedom (intervention axis) | Freedom in the World — total score 0-100 (higher = more free) | Freedom House (via Our World in Data) | 2025 | ↓ priority |
- Unemployment (15-24, male)↑ priority
Male youth unemployment, 15-24 (% male labor force)
SL.UEM.1524.MA.ZS
World Bank · ILOSTAT modeled estimates
Latest data · 2025
- Unemployment (15+, male)↑ priority
Male unemployment, 15+ (% male labor force)
SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS
World Bank · ILOSTAT modeled estimates
Latest data · 2025
- Violence↑ priority
Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)
VC.IHR.PSRC.P5
Latest data · 2023
- Internet access↓ priority
Individuals using the Internet (% of population)
IT.NET.USER.ZS
Latest data · 2024
- Mobile subscriptions↓ priority
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
IT.CEL.SETS.P2
Latest data · 2024
- Electricity access↓ priority
Access to electricity (% of population)
EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS
IEA / World Bank Tracking SDG7
Latest data · 2024
- AI usage↓ priority
AI tool usage (surveyed)
Latest data · 2025
% of internet users who used any AI tool in the past month (DataReportal / GWI), converted to % of population using internet penetration.
- Population (context)context
Population, total
SP.POP.TOTL
UN Population Division · via World Bank
Latest data · 2025
- Working-age share (context)context
Population ages 15-64 (% of total)
SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS
UN Population Division · via World Bank
Latest data · 2025
- Phone ownership↓ priority
Individuals owning a mobile phone (% of population)
Latest data · 2025
- Freedom (intervention axis)↓ priority
Freedom in the World — total score 0-100 (higher = more free)
Freedom House (via Our World in Data)
Latest data · 2025