Europe & Central Asia · SRB

Serbia

21
Composite priority
20.4%
Male youth unemployment · 2025
6.59M
Population · 2024
63.0%
Ages 15-64 · 2024
1.3 per 100k
Homicides · 2023

Location

44.80°, 20.47° · ISO SRB / RSOpen in OpenStreetMap →

Priority breakdown

0 = lowest · 100 = highest

Male youth unemployment20.4%· 52p
2025
Intentional homicides1.3 per 100k· 3p
2023
Internet access87.7%· 13p
2024
Mobile subscriptions123.8 per 100· 44p
2024
Phone ownership95.7%· 7p
2023
Electricity access100.0%· 0p
2023
AI usage21.9%· 13p
2024 · est.

Composite = mean of available dimensions, 5th-95th percentile clipped, direction-adjusted. Instability (unemployment, violence) raises score with value. Access (internet, devices, electricity, AI) raises score with absence.

Trajectory

20152026 · replay

How the scores moved.

Scores recomputed historically by replaying each year's indicator values through the current normalizer. Useful for direction, less so for absolute magnitude. World Bank series lag 1-2 years.

Fuse 7.7p vs 2021
31
Access gap 6.0p vs 2021
15
Impact 7.0p vs 2021
22

Latest signals

2026-06-25 18:00 UTC · run 2026-06-25T18

What the signals agent found, in the last ~60 days.

Live web search via Grok, scoped to this country. Structural indicators above lag by 1-2 years; this section is what changed recently.

Signals
**Recent data on youth unemployment shows a slight increase from the 2025 baseline.** The Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS) Labour Force Survey reports a youth (15-24) unemployment rate of 23.1% for Q1 2026 (down marginally from 23.3% in Q4 2025).[[1]](https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-us/oblasti/trziste-rada/anketa-o-radnoj-snazi/)[[2]](https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/youth-unemployment-rate) Trading Economics confirms this figure, citing SORS as the source. No new ILO or World Bank releases on youth or male-specific unemployment (15-24 male national) appear in the last 60 days; the baseline of 20.4% (2025 male) remains the most recent cited male-specific benchmark. Broader youth (15-30) unemployment was reported at 16.4% for 2024 in one policy overview.[[3]](https://national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu/youthwiki/chapters/serbia/41-general-context)

**Significant political developments involve large-scale, student- and youth-led anti-government protests.** These have continued into 2026, centered on anti-corruption demands, accountability for the 2024 Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse (which killed 16), calls for snap elections, and opposition to President Aleksandar Vučić’s rule. Key events in the last 60 days include a major Belgrade protest on or around May 23, 2026, with estimates of 180,000–190,000 participants (government figures much lower at ~34,000); it was described as one of the largest in recent years and student-driven.[[4]](http://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2026/05/25/serbias-protest-was-too-large-to-ignore-so-the-government-changed-the-subject/)[[5]](https://www.dw.com/en/serbia-police-clash-with-protesters-urging-early-elections/a-77274618) Clashes occurred between some young demonstrators and police, involving flares, rocks, and bottles.[[5]](https://www.dw.com/en/serbia-police-clash-with-protesters-urging-early-elections/a-77274618) Further rallies took place in Novi Sad on June 20, 2026 (thousands of participants, marking the disaster anniversary and pushing for early elections), with the broader movement described as student-led and ongoing for over 18 months.[[6]](https://www.reuters.com/world/thousands-rally-serbias-north-demand-early-elections-2026-06-20/) These protests heavily involve young people (18-35 demographic) and represent the most notable instability-related development, potentially elevating risks beyond the baseline instability fuse score of 31.1/100 due to scale, duration, and youth mobilization. No reports of coup attempts, militia recruitment, or major economic/currency shocks specific to young men were identified.

**No notable new NGO or academic reports on Serbia’s youth situation published in 2025 were surfaced in recent searches** (some references exist to earlier analyses, such as a 2025 Bruegel piece on youth discontent via labor market data, but it is not newly published).[[7]](https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/understanding-serbian-youth-discontent-through-lens-labour-market)

**No adverse changes to internet or mobile infrastructure access (e.g., shutdowns) were reported for Serbia.** Instead, positive developments include rapid 5G rollout and digital government improvements (e.g., World Bank-supported EDGE project and spectrum auctions completed in late 2025, with performance gains noted into 2026).[[8]](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2026/02/25/serbia-s-quiet-digital-transformation)[[9]](https://www.ookla.com/articles/serbia-5g-2026) Broader Q1 2026 global disruption reports do not mention Serbia.[[10]](https://blog.cloudflare.com/q1-2026-internet-disruption-summary/)

**Overall assessment:** The most significant shift from baseline is the sustained, large-scale student/youth-led protests in May–June 2026, which could indicate heightened political instability risks for young men. Unemployment data shows continuity with a modest uptick in the overall youth rate but no dramatic change. No infrastructure disruptions or major new economic data releases were found. Sources include official SORS data via Trading Economics, news outlets (DW, Reuters, Le Monde, European Western Balkans), and policy platforms.
Source discovery
**National statistics bureau:**  
- **Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS / RZS)** — https://www.stat.gov.rs/ (Labour Force Survey / dissemination database section). Machine-readable downloads (Excel/CSV via dissemination database; press releases with detailed indicators). No public API. Quarterly/annual updates for labor/unemployment data. Auth: none. Also offers RSS feeds (e.g., https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-US/RSS-link).[[1]](https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-us/oblasti/trziste-rada/anketa-o-radnoj-snazi/)

**Central bank / finance ministry:**  
- **National Bank of Serbia (NBS)** — https://www.nbs.rs/en/drugi-nivo-navigacije/statistika/. Excel downloads for employment, wages, and real-sector indicators (youth-relevant economic data). No dedicated public statistics API (third-party exchange-rate APIs exist but are not official NBS). Monthly/quarterly updates. Auth: none.[[2]](https://www.nbs.rs/en/drugi-nivo-navigacije/statistika/)

**Regional databases (Europe & Central Asia breakdowns):**  
- **ILOSTAT Europe & Central Asia** — https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/europe-and-central-asia/. Country-level labor statistics (including youth employment/unemployment) with bulk downloads and SDMX access options. API/partial (SDMX web services). Regular updates (annual/quarterly). Auth: none (free bulk/SDMX).[[3]](https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/europe-and-central-asia/)  
- **SEE Jobs Gateway Database (wiiw)** — https://wiiw.ac.at/see-jobs-gateway-database-ds-5.html. Detailed labor-market time series (19,700+ series) for Western Balkans including Serbia. Downloads (no API mentioned). Periodic updates. Auth: none (free access).[[4]](https://wiiw.ac.at/see-jobs-gateway-database-ds-5.html)  
- **Eurostat (candidate countries)** — https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (labour market statistics). Covers Serbia as EU candidate with harmonized LFS data. API available (Eurostat API). Regular (annual/quarterly). Auth: none.[[5]](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Labour_market_statistics_at_regional_level)

**Local/regional news RSS feeds (reliable coverage of Serbia):**  
- **Balkan Insight Serbia feeds** — https://balkaninsight.com/category/bi/serbia/feed/ (and related regional feeds). RSS for in-depth Serbia reporting. No API. Frequent updates. Auth: none.[[6]](https://balkaninsight.com/rss-feeds/)  
- **B92 English** — https://www.b92.net/eng/ (RSS available via site). Reliable English-language Serbia coverage. No dedicated API. Frequent updates. Auth: none.

**NGO/think tank data APIs:**  
No prominent public data APIs specifically for Serbia youth/poverty/crisis monitoring were identified beyond the already-used sources (e.g., Freedom House/OWID). General regional or international NGOs (UNDP Serbia, etc.) typically provide reports or aggregate data rather than dedicated APIs.

These sources focus on direct, machine-accessible or downloadable data suitable for integration, excluding inference-based or modeled datasets. They complement the listed existing sources (World Bank, ACLED, etc.).

Full run history: /sources

Trends · 2014–2026

Each dimension, over time.

Male youth unemployment

%
18.433.348.32014202520.4%

Intentional homicides

per 100k
0.61.42.1201420231.3

Internet access

%
60.074.989.72014202487.7%

Mobile subscriptions

per 100
119.3125.8132.220142024123.8

Phone ownership

%
No data

Electricity access

%
99.299.8100.520142023100.0%

AI usage

%
15.018.722.42014202421.9%

Population

people
6542851.16859131.57175411.9201420246586476.0

Working-age share

%
62.565.167.82014202463.0%

Provenance

Where the numbers come from.

Every dimension in the priority score has a public, citable source. Window 2014–2026. Signed-input pipeline lands with v2.