Yemen, Rep.

**No major new official data releases or significant shifts in youth unemployment figures for Yemen (Rep.) in the last ~60 days (roughly early April to early June 2026).** Modeled ILO/World Bank estimates remain consistent with the baseline of ~32% youth unemployment (15-24, national; male-specific baseline cited at 32.0% for 2025).[[1]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSYEM)[[2]](https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5269114-yemen%E2%80%99s-workers-face-harsh-unemployment-and-unrelenting-hardship)

- FRED/World Bank data (updated Feb 2026, reflecting 2025 figures): Youth unemployment (15-24, modeled ILO estimate) at 32.598% for 2025 (up slightly from 32.172% in 2024). No 2026 national estimates released.[[1]](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSYEM)
- May 3, 2026 reporting (Asharq Al-Awsat): World Bank notes ~1 in 6 working-age individuals unemployed nationally; youth unemployment described as “bleaker” than the regional Arab average (>25% per ILO estimates), with conflict and economic contraction cited as drivers. No Yemen-specific updated percentage provided.[[2]](https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5269114-yemen%E2%80%99s-workers-face-harsh-unemployment-and-unrelenting-hardship)
- April 30, 2026 ReliefWeb/Yemen Socio-Economic Update (Issue 88): Discusses rising unemployment/poverty from economic contraction over the past decade and calls for youth employment/vocational programs, but cites no new statistical releases.[[3]](https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-socio-economic-update-issue-88-january-2026-enar)

Global ILO Trends 2026 (Jan 2026) notes high youth unemployment pressures in low-income contexts but provides no Yemen-specific updates.[[4]](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166751)

**Political/security/economic events (last 60 days) affecting young men (18-35):** Limited new escalations directly tied to youth/militia dynamics, but ongoing humanitarian and economic pressures continue to heighten risks. A notable positive development was the May 14, 2026 UN-brokered agreement for the release of over 1,600 conflict-related detainees—the largest such exchange since the conflict began—which could reduce pressures on detained or militia-involved youth.[[5]](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-06/yemen-89.php)[[6]](https://news.un.org/en/focus-topic/focus-yemen)

- Humanitarian/economic strain: Multiple April–May 2026 reports highlight deterioration, with ~18.3 million facing acute food insecurity (IPC analysis) and severe funding shortfalls for the 2026 HNRP ($2.16 billion requested, only 14% covered as of mid-May). This exacerbates economic shocks and potential recruitment or instability drivers for young men amid high youth joblessness.[[5]](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-06/yemen-89.php)[[7]](https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-april-2026)[[7]](https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-april-2026)
- Southern tensions (STC/government clashes): Primarily referenced in early 2026 (Feb protests/clashes in Aden/Shabwah); residual volatility noted into spring but no major new incidents flagged in the window.[[8]](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-04/yemen-88.php)
- Regional/Houthi context: Ceasefire-related developments (post-April 7 Iran-related announcement) and economic vulnerabilities (imports, fuel/food prices) noted, but no direct youth-specific impacts detailed.[[5]](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-06/yemen-89.php)

No reports of new coup attempts, large-scale protests, or militia recruitment drives specifically in the last 60 days.

**Notable NGO/academic reports on youth (published 2025):** Several 2025 reports address youth needs, education, and NGO sustainability amid conflict, though none appear to be brand-new releases in the last 60 days.

- Sana’a Center qualitative study (focus groups/interviews with youth researchers/activists): Examines war’s impact on youth priorities (e.g., shifting toward basic needs/security vs. pre-war aspirations).[[9]](https://sanaacenter.org/publications/policy-research/16177)
- BTI 2026 Yemen Country Report: Notes challenges for a “young generation socialized by war, violence and militant ideologies,” with militias controlling significant population areas.[[10]](https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/YEM)[[10]](https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/YEM)
- May 2025 study on NGO sustainability in Yemen (Sana’a University/ResearchGate): Mixed-methods assessment (surveys/interviews Oct 2024–Mar 2025) of L/NNGO financial/strategic challenges.[[11]](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392309029_Sustainability_of_NGOs_in_Yemen)
- Yemen Education Sector Plan 2024-2030 and related UNICEF/government youth empowerment plan (2025–2030): Highlight demographic youth bulge (high proportion of children/youth) and education access barriers.[[12]](https://educationoutloud.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Yemen-ESP-2024-2030-ENG.pdf)

**Internet/mobile infrastructure:** No major new national rollouts, coverage expansions, or widespread shutdowns specifically documented in the last 60 days. A crowdsourced shutdown tracker lists several 2026 incidents (mostly earlier in the year, e.g., Aden, Amran/Saada, and others in Jan–Apr), with limited or no verified activity flagged for May–early June.[[13]](https://www.shutdowns.yodet.org/)

**Assessment vs. baseline (youth unemployment 32.0% male 2025; instability fuse 92.9/100):** No developments in the last 60 days appear to warrant a significant upward or downward revision. Unemployment metrics remain stable per available modeled data, while persistent humanitarian/economic deterioration could sustain or incrementally increase youth instability risks (e.g., via food insecurity or limited opportunities). The May detainee release represents a modest positive signal for de-escalation and family/youth relief. Sources are primarily World Bank, ILO/FRED, UN/ReliefWeb, and media reporting from April–May 2026.

**Yemen, Rep.-specific or highly relevant non-inference data sources (beyond the listed ones like World Bank, ACLED, etc.):**

- **Central Statistical Organization (CSO) Yemen** — https://cso-ye.org/en/ (official site with Labor Force Indicators, monthly price indicators, foreign trade, household/nutrition data, Statistical Yearbook 2023, and Interactive Portal for maps/indicators). No API; machine-readable downloads/PDFs and tables available. Updates: annual yearbooks + periodic indicators (e.g., monthly prices). Auth: none (public).[[1]](https://cso-ye.org/en/)

- **Central Bank of Yemen (CBY)** — https://www.english.cby-ye.com/ (English site with annual reports containing economic/monetary/financial indicators, balance of payments, CPI, GDP-related data). No API; PDF reports with statistical tables. Updates: annual. Auth: none (public).[[2]](https://www.english.cby-ye.com/files/66e7e260be038.pdf)

- **Arab Development Portal (ESCWA/UN)** — https://data.unescwa.org/ (country dashboards for Yemen with economic indicators, labor/employment, macro data, SDGs; searchable catalog with MENA/Arab country breakdowns). API: yes (powerful query support noted in data catalogs). Updates: ongoing/as new official data released. Auth: none/free (public portal).[[3]](https://data.unescwa.org/)

- **Yemen RSS/news aggregation feeds** (e.g., via Feedspot or direct outlets) — Examples include curated Yemen RSS lists at https://rss.feedspot.com/yemen_rss_feeds/ (covers local/regional reliable sources). No dedicated public API for most; use general news APIs like NewsData.io or World News API (Yemen-specific endpoints). Updates: real-time/daily. Auth: none for RSS; free tier/paid for APIs.[[4]](https://rss.feedspot.com/yemen_rss_feeds/)

- **Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies / similar think tanks** (e.g., via ReliefWeb or direct publications) — Reports on crisis monitoring, economic impacts, and youth-related indicators (often with downloadable datasets or tables). No dedicated public API; PDF/Excel downloads. Updates: periodic (reports). Auth: none (public). (Note: Complements but does not duplicate ACLED.)

These focus on direct or downloadable access suitable for integration (e.g., via scraping structured tables or PDFs where no API exists). Yemen’s data ecosystem is fragmented due to conflict, with many sources relying on PDFs or periodic releases rather than real-time APIs. ESCWA stands out for structured regional coverage with API potential. Always verify current availability, as sites can change.